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Abstract Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the
majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We
investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament’s voting
behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the
years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives’
incentives to adhere to citizens’ revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically sig-
nificant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts
with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences.
Keywords Voter preferences · Political economy · Electoral systems
JEL Classification D72 · D70 · H00
1 Introduction
The influence of electoral systems on policy outcomes is not only at the center of the pub-
lic debate on policy reforms but it also increasingly attracts the interest of economists (see
Grossman and Helpman 2005; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Persson et al. 2007). A main fo-
cus of analysis is district size and how it aligns the behavior of representatives with citizens’
preferences. From a theoretical perspective, district magnitude, i.e., a district’s number of
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seats in parliament, determines incentives for representatives. Members of parliament from
districts with many seats and proportional representation may win elections by proposing
policies for groups at the boundaries of the electoral spectrum. Conversely, members of
parliament from districts with a limited number of seats or close to plurality systems are
supposed to propose platforms closer to the majority’s interests (see Gagliarducci et al.
2008). Moreover, for members of parliament from districts with many seats, representa-
tion of their voters’ interests may become a public good, while members of parliament
from districts with fewer seats may have to take personal accountability for their decisions
(see Lizzeri and Persico 2001). Thus, moving from a few seats towards a proportional sys-
tem induces individual members of parliament to diverge more from the majority’s will.
However, the clarity of the theoretical reasoning contrasts with the lack of empirical
evidence. To date, no study has analyzed the influence of electoral systems on the behavior
of representatives by directly comparing their behavior with revealed voters’ preferences on
exactly the same issues.
In this paper we analyze how the number of representatives per district influences, ce-
teris paribus, the incentives of individual members of parliament to vote according to the
preferences of the majority of the citizens. Switzerland offers a unique quasi-experimental
setting to analyze the incentives of politicians to act according to the will of the majority:
The electoral districts for national parliamentary elections coincide with the Cantons, i.e.,
the Swiss states. District magnitudes, i.e., the number of seats per district, differ largely,
ranging from small districts with one seat and pure plurality rule to large districts with 34
seats and proportional representation. Thus, in the Swiss electoral system, a change from
one seat to many seats also reflects a change from pure plurality to proportional representa-
tion. Similar to other democratic countries, members of the Swiss national parliament vote
on new laws and law changes as well as constitutional amendments. But, in contrast to other
countries, a relatively small number of Swiss citizens (50 000 from a total population of
almost eight million) can demand a popular referendum on parliamentary decisions before
laws are enacted. In addition to parliamentary amendments, a group of citizens (100 000)
can also start an initiative and demand a constitutional amendment. Members of parliament
then have to express their opinion on the proposed amendments before the population votes
on them. In these popular votes, citizens reveal their preferences for policy outcomes by
ranking law proposals against the status quo (see, e.g., Schneider et al. 1981; Cronin 1989;
Matsusaka 1992; Frey 1994; Besley and Coate 2008).
This setting makes Switzerland an ideal field to study the influence of district magni-
tude on the relationship between voters and their representatives. Thus, we match Swiss
referendums data with voting data from individual members of parliament on exactly the
same political issues with the same wording. This allows us to identify empirically whether
members of parliament from large districts with proportional representation diverge more
from the preferences of the majority of the voters than politicians from small districts. To
the best of our knowledge, no previous research has matched revealed voter preferences
from referendums with real policy decisions in parliament and analyzed the effects of dis-
trict size on divergence between voters and members of parliament. We directly identify two
variables which indicate whether members of parliament have voted in accordance with the
majority of voters at the district level as well as at the national level. These two dependent
variables are explained by the number of seats in parliament, i.e., the electoral system, of
a district. Empirical results indicate that decisions of members of parliament from districts
with a large number of seats and proportional representation diverge, ceteris paribus, more
from the majority of constituents as well as from the national majority’s preferences. Plu-
rality rule, as measured by a low number of seats, tends to align decisions of members of
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parliament with district voters’ preferences as well as national voters’ preferences. These
results are highly robust when we control for a large number of variables which may induce
deviations between members of parliament and voters’ preferences, e.g., party positions,
individual characteristics of parliamentarians, and district characteristics.
As an important advantage, our research focuses on differences within a single coun-
try. Thus, it avoids problems common to cross-country research: When analyzing political
decisions and preferences across countries, specific norms, rules, political patterns, history,
culture and institutional contexts should be taken into account. In our case the sub-national
electoral districts provide a broad empirical field within a common framework of identical
basic characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 provides a brief literature re-
view, theoretical considerations and additional explanations of the electoral system’s effects
on voting behavior of members of parliament. Section 3 presents the data, the econometric
approach as well as a short overview on the Swiss political system and the role of referen-
dums. Empirical results for all members of parliament in 102 national referendums over the
years 1996 to 2008 are presented in Sect. 4. The econometric robustness of our hypotheses
is extensively tested considering differential hypotheses and using Bayesian Model Aver-
aging to investigate the effect of variable selection. Finally, Sect. 5 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 Literature and theory
2.1 Literature overview
Starting with Duverger (1954) and Downs (1957), large parts of the theoretical literature
have focused on the electoral systems’ influence on the number of political parties and their
positions. “Duverger’s Law” and its modifications usually predict the emergence of and
two-party competition in districts with plurality rule. Downs (1957) first described what
positions political candidates would take when competing for a seat in a small district with
one seat only. The well-known result in a Downsian world is convergence to the median
voter’s position. Thus, the early literature argues that electoral competition in small districts
concentrates on winning the majority as only few persons can gain seats in the district (for
more recent contributions see, among others, Cox 1997; Persson and Tabellini 2002, 2005;
Lizzeri and Persico 2001).
In contrast, proportional representation in districts with many seats induces multi-party
competition, and parties are expected to take more dispersed positions in multi-member
districts as argued by Cox (1990). Generally speaking, in a system of proportional represen-
tation electoral competition is spread over the whole political spectrum as the median voter
loses part of its importance (see, e.g., Taagepera and Shugart 1989). But of course, there
are also mechanisms which may induce diffused political positions under plurality rule (see
Cox 1997). For instance, Bordignon and Tabellini (2010) show that under dual ballot (where
citizens select a subset of candidates in a first round and cast a final vote in a second round)
the number of political positions increases. However, plurality with a dual ballot may re-
duce the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy outcomes under sincere voting
because dual ballot reduces the bargaining power of extremist parties.
Political representation has certain characteristics of a public good. Lancaster (1986)
argues that regional representation is a public good for members of parliament from districts
with many seats. If many members of parliament claim responsibility for a certain policy
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with local ramifications, each individual deputy’s incentives to provide good representation
may decrease. Hence, the link between representatives and their constituencies is strongest
in plurality or close to plurality systems with few seats.
There is a growing empirical literature analyzing the effects of district magnitude, i.e.,
proportional representation, on party positions. For instance, Dow (2001) finds differences in
the extent of spatial dispersion among parties and candidates between plurality and propor-
tional electoral systems when comparing data from election studies and surveys for Canada,
Israel, the Netherlands and France. In systems with small districts, parties and candidates
are located significantly closer to the majority within the distribution of voters than their
counterparts in proportional systems.
Members of parliament may also face several competing principals and competing inter-
ests when representing voters’ interests according to empirical studies by Carey (2007) or
Braendle and Stutzer (2010). Party affiliations, interest groups, personal linkages and hetero-
geneity play a role apart from the electoral system. Crisp et al. (2004) argue empirically with
data of bill initiation activity in six presidential democracies that with centralized candidate
selection and as district magnitude increases, members of parliament will less frequently
initiate legislation aimed at a particular constituency and rather focus on the national party’s
interest. By analyzing voting results of two different amendments enacted by the Swiss par-
liament and surveys conducted amongst the legislators, Bailer et al. (2008) find that deputies
elected under proportional representation, i.e., from districts with a larger number of seats,
act closer in accordance with their parties than deputies from small plurality or close to
plurality districts. Thus, district magnitude influences members of parliament through their
party affiliations.
Policy outcomes have recently started to attract the interest of political economists (see
Grossman and Helpman 2005). When focusing on individual or group welfare, researchers
predominantly captured policy outcomes by fiscal policy measures. Persson and Tabellini
(1999) as well as Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) argue that spending on transfers is extended
further under proportional electoral systems due to different incentives for redistribution.
These authors are mainly concerned with incentives for pork barrels under alternative elec-
toral systems. Milligan and Smart (2005) find for Canada which exhibits a plurality system
that governing parties target swing districts. These findings substantiate the hypothesis that
plurality systems create a direct incentive for members of parliament to better target the
majority of voters with specific policies when the number of seats is small. Conversely, un-
der proportional representation members of parliament may concentrate on different groups
over the political spectrum instead of focusing on the majority’s preferences.
2.2 Theoretical considerations
The question of how different electoral rules shape a nation’s political system has received
much attention amongst economists and political scientists (for more recent contributions
see Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Bawn and Thies 2003; or Blume
et al. 2009). In contrast, the question of how individual decisions of members of parliament
affect voter utility and welfare has received less thought.
The outlined literature identified two main channels for decreasing incentives to respond
to the majority’s interests in districts with many representatives and proportional representa-
tion: First, deputies from districts with a limited number of seats need to propose platforms
closer to the center while deputies from districts with many seats may also win elections by
proposing policies for groups at the margin. Thus, proportional representation with many
seats induces individual members of parliament to cater less for the voter majority. When
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district size decreases, members of parliament need to focus more on the majority’s prefer-
ences in order to win elections.
Second, we also expect individual members of parliament from smaller district to act
more according to the majority’s interest because regional representation is a public good.
With many members of parliament who claim responsibility for a certain policy with lo-
cal ramifications, each individual deputy’s incentives to provide local representation de-
crease. Hence the link between members of parliament and citizens preferences is stronger
in smaller districts.
All these arguments lead us to the hypothesis that individual members of parliament from
districts of small magnitude, i.e. with a low number of seats, represent, ceteris paribus, the
majority’s preferences better than individual members of parliament from large districts.
As district magnitude increases, the Swiss electoral system changes from pure plurality to
proportional representation. We are thus able to test our hypothesis.
3 Data and estimation strategy
3.1 Overcoming measurement problems
Stratmann (1995), Bender and Lott (1996), Gerber and Lewis (2004) and Golder and Stram-
ski (2010) among others argue that a major problem of empirical studies is to determine
voters’ positions with respect to law proposals and to match them with decisions or posi-
tions of members of parliament. Positions of voters and politicians are usually constructed
policy dimensions which stem from survey data. Party positions are no measures for policy
outcomes. Financial measures allow identifying effects of electoral systems on policy out-
comes but they are no sensible measure of the majority’s preferences especially when more
policy dimensions exist such as equity vs. equality, liberal vs. conservative, etc.
We overcome possible measurement problems by introducing two unique measures for
the majority’s preferences which are confronted with real policy decisions by members of
parliament. In referendums, Swiss citizens regularly cast their votes on law and consti-
tutional proposals which have passed national parliament with exactly the same wording.
Referendums results determine policy outcomes and are at the same time the revealed pref-
erences of citizens for these outcomes. More precisely, referendums permit the majority
to rank policy outcomes induced by the proposed laws against the status quo. Thereby,
decisions in referendums are capable of capturing much broader issues than fiscal policy
measures and it is not necessary to rely on expert’s judgment or surveys on the utility impli-
cations for the majority. The majority’s preferences reveal themselves in a referendum.
To evaluate the influence of the number of seats, i.e., the electoral system, in a district on
voting with or against the majority of voters, we match data of 102 referendums with infor-
mation on votes with the same wording of individual members of parliament in Switzerland
for the years 1996 to 2008. Thereby, we create a unique dataset where real choices of all
legislators on all referendums can be confronted with real choices of voters on exactly the
same issues.
The Swiss National Council, i.e., the lower house, has 200 seats. The 26 Swiss cantons
(sub-national jurisdictions) form the national parliament’s electoral districts. The number
of seats for each canton is proportional to the cantons’ population sizes. Population size
and, thus, the number of seats differ largely between cantons. The six cantons Appenzell
a.R., Appenzell i.R., Glarus, Nidwalden, Obwalden, and Uri have only one representative
in parliament and exhibit pure plurality systems. 13 electoral districts have between one
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Table 1 Swiss cantons
Notes: The official seat
distribution is calculated based
on the 2000 population census.
Number of resident permanent
population in Switzerland
according to census and the
districts’ number of seats in the
National Council after 2003.
Source: Federal Statistical Office
Canton Population in 1000 Seats in Council
Aargau 540.639 15
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 53.737 1
Appenzell Innerrhoden 14.946 1
Basel-Landschaft 258.602 7
Basel-Stadt 188.458 5
Bern/Berne 943.427 26
Fribourg/Freiburg 234.307 7
Genève 403.067 11
Glarus 38.708 1
Graubünden/Grigioni 186.026 5
Jura 68.818 2
Luzern 345.357 10
Neuchâtel 165.649 5
Nidwalden 37.657 1
Obwalden 32.225 1
Schaffhausen 73.552 2
Schwyz 128.248 4
Solothurn 243.908 7
St. Gallen 447.609 12
Thurgau 227.285 6
Ticino 308.498 8
Uri 35.487 1
Valais/Wallis 275.632 7
Vaud 616.275 18
Zug 97.758 3
Zürich 1198.569 34
Total 7164.444 200
and five members of parliament while the remaining cantons have more than five members
of parliament. This large heterogeneity allows us to identify the effect of district size on
voting behavior of deputies in parliament under different electoral systems (see Table 1 for
an overview over the cantons, with their respective number of seats and their population
size).
The National Council has 12 committees, each concerned with a policy area such as
foreign affairs, social security, health, etc. These committees formulate the proposals for
laws and law changes which are presented to the plenum where all members of parliament
decide on them. The parliamentary services record individual votes carried out on legislative
proposals for every member of parliament and make them publicly available. A proposal is
adopted as new law or as a constitutional amendment if the majorities of both, the National
Council and the Council of States (i.e., the upper house or senate), approve it.
However, proposals adopted by parliament do not necessarily turn into law (see, e.g.,
Kirchgässner et al. 1999; Fossedal 2002). If a legislative proposal aims to change the con-
stitution, a referendum is mandatory. Moreover, for such mandatory referendums a double
majority is required: the majority of the national electorate as well as a majority of the elec-
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torate in 11 and a half-canton1 (“Ständemehr” in German) have to agree to the proposed
change.
If parliament intends to change or enact a new law, a referendum is not mandatory. All
the same, Swiss citizens may demand a referendum on the proposed legislation by collecting
at least 50 000 signatures (“facultative referendum”). The proposed law change is rejected if
50% of the population votes against it in a referendum. A majority of cantons is not required.
Finally, citizens may also demand a constitutional amendment by referendum (called
“initiative”) by collecting at least 100 000 signatures. Members of parliament are required
to vote on the text of an initiative which serves as a parliamentary recommendation for the
referendum. Parliament and the government cannot refuse an initiative unless it violates for-
mal rules. However, they can work out a counter-proposal to the initiative which is presented
to the voters at the same time as the initiative in a referendum.
Referendums results are available for every electoral district and for the whole pe-
riod of analysis from the years 1996 to 2008 by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and
the Swissvotes Database. Decisions in parliament usually precede referendums by several
months, the respective parliamentary decisions were made from 1995 to 2007. We are able
to compare legislative decisions by members of parliament with referendum outcomes on
exactly the same legislative issues and with the same wording. Thus, we observe decisions
of voters and members of parliament in the unique policy dimension which is defined by the
referendum itself. This permits us to test empirically the effects of differences in the electoral
system by analyzing whether members of parliament from smaller districts more effectively
cater to the citizens’ preferences by voting more with the majority while members of parlia-
ment from larger districts diverge more from the majority. Put differently, we can identify
whether the electoral system has an influence on how well members of parliament represent
their voters’ interests.
As dependent variables we employ two indicator variables: The first indicator takes the
value of one when a member of parliament does not vote as the majority of the whole Swiss
population (MP = CH) and zero if he/she votes as the majority. The second indicator equals
one when a member of parliament does not vote as the majority in his/her district (MP =
District). Consequently, the two dependent variables measure deviations by members of
parliament from the will of the people at the national and the district level, respectively.
3.2 Estimation equation
Our econometric logistic model explaining deviations from the majority is given by:
P (MP = CH) = (α0 + α1Seats +
∑
j
αj xj + ε) (1)
P (MP = District) = (α0 + α1Seats +
∑
j
αj xj + ε) (2)
The two dependent variables are binary measures. Therefore, we use a logistic (logit)
model ( = exp(X)/(1 + exp(X)) with X as design matrix). We estimate the impact of
exogenous variables on the probability that a member of parliament votes against the ma-
jority of citizens in Switzerland (MP = CH) in (1) or against his/her district’s majority
1For historical reasons, there are 20 full cantons and 6 half cantons (“Halbkantone”). There is no important
difference between full and half cantons except that the latter have only one member in the upper house, each,
and that they only count with half weight when calculating the “Ständemehr”.
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(MP = District) in (2). The equations are motivated theoretically by the expected positive
impact of a higher number of seats a district has in parliament on the probability that a mem-
ber of parliament deviates from the majority. Thus, we expect α1 > 0. For each coefficient
we estimate robust standard errors. Standard errors are also clustered at the district level as
the error terms for observations within a district can be correlated, and the assumption that
the errors are independently and identically distributed might be violated. District clustering
allows us to estimate cluster robust standard errors and provides a conservative test for our
hypotheses.
Political decisions of members of parliament are not only influenced by the number of
seats of their respective electoral district. In our case the sub-national units provide a broad
empirical field within a common framework of identical basic characteristics as opposed to
international comparisons. However, we include a number of political and economic con-
trol variables in the model. Their different impacts are represented by the coefficients αj .
The empirical analysis includes data on referendum results, type of referendums, turnout,
individual characteristics and party affiliations of members of parliament, as well as socio-
demographic and economic variables characterizing the 26 Swiss cantons.
In addition to the variable Seats which measures effects of the electoral system, we con-
trol whether the district has voted as the majority of the national population by including
a dummy variable which equals one if this is the case (Canton = CH). Elected represen-
tatives to the national parliament may not only represent national interests as their mission
would suggest. They may also try to please their local voters or engage in pork barrels
(Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002). Therefore we expect that a member of parliament is less likely
(negative sign) to deviate from the national as well as the district’s majority if his/her district
votes in line with the majority of the national population.
Out of 102 referendums analyzed, 18 are constitutional changes initiated by the parlia-
ment. As mentioned above, constitutional proposals require mandatory referendums. With
mandatory referendums, politicians know in advance that citizens have to confirm legislative
decisions in a referendum; otherwise such proposal cannot be enacted. They know for sure
that their decisions are compared with the district majority’s will. Thus, we include a dummy
variable which indicates whether a referendum was mandatory or not (RefMandatory). We
expect a negative influence of mandatory referendums on the probability of a representative
voting against the voters’ majority at the national and the cantonal level. Moreover, we in-
clude a dummy variable to control for the influence of the 50 initiatives (RefInitiative) on
divergence between citizens and members of parliament. Initiatives are often advanced by
small political groups with specific interests. They are often clearly rejected by members
of parliament and the majority of citizens. Thus, we expect a negative sign for divergence
between politicians and voters in the case of initiatives. The 34 facultative referendums form
the omitted category.
A district’s voter turnout (Turnout) is always included in the estimations as a measure for
perceived importance of the referendum. The sign of voter turnout is ambiguous, a priori.
High voter turnout may reflect the fact that the issue of the referendum is considered as
important. However, important issues for voters are also likely to be important issues for
interest groups. Moreover, high voter turnout may be a sign of discontent with political
decisions. Whether a high turnout correlates with a high probability that a representative
votes in the same way as the majority of the voters depends on the relative importance he or
she puts on voters versus interest groups and his personal linkages.
An individual representative may be more prone to departing from the majority’s posi-
tion when he/she can be more confident about re-election while new members of parliament
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may try to satisfy the majority. We control whether a representative is new to parliament or
not (NewToParliament). We expect a negative effect of being new to parliament on diver-
gence. Moreover, the vote margin with which each member of parliament has been elected
may matters. Members of parliament with narrower margins might be more worried about
reelection, thus making them more likely to correspond to voters’ preferences. However, it
may also be the case that exactly these representatives try to please lobbies to seek funds
for reelection and are, thus, generally less likely to represent the majority of voters. To con-
trol for a possible bias of a narrow electoral margin we include a dummy variable which
indicates whether a politician has been elected with the fewest number of votes on the list
(NarrowMargin). We have no clear expectations for this variable.
“Duverger’s Law” in political science (Duverger 1954) states that proportional represen-
tation leads to a multi-party system while a simple-majority favors a two-party system. As
a consequence, members of parliament from plurality districts tend to be members of center
parties while representatives from districts with proportional representation might be from
all over the political spectrum. Thus, we also present estimations with controls for party
affiliation. The electoral system induces different party positions. Once we control for these
party positions, it is unclear whether there is still a direct effect of district magnitude on
individual members of parliament or whether magnitude influences parties only. Therefore
the inclusion of party affiliations serves as a very stringent and conservative test for the in-
fluence of the electoral system on individual members of parliament. Any effect captured
by the Seats variable is a lower bound estimate for the influence of the electoral system
on diverging from citizens’ preferences. In our setting the center party called Christian De-
mocrats (Christlich Demokratische Volkspartei CVP, in German) forms the omitted group.
On a left-right scale for Switzerland, the large parties are commonly ordered as follows: So-
cialist Party SP (left); Christian Democrats CVP (center) and Liberals FDP (center); Swiss
Peoples Party SVP (right). There are also a number of smaller parties with only very few
representatives in parliament. Members of parliament from these parties often join the party
group (the ‘Fraktion’) of the larger parties. We control for these smaller parties with separate
dummies if they have more than one member of parliament over the whole sample period.2
Members of parliament also have to provide information on their interest affiliation with
special interest groups, private companies and other institutions. We compiled data on the
number of interest affiliations for each politician in parliament (Interests). According to
Lizzeri and Persico (2001) politicians caring about the “spoils of office” may provide public
goods differently under proportional versus winner-take-all systems. The empirical effect
of the number of interest group affiliations on divergence between politicians and voters is
ambiguous for several reasons: Firstly, especially politicians from the center are members
of interest groups. Secondly, interests groups are very diverse: The Swiss Cancer Society
is officially classed as an interest group as are mandates for financial institutions. Thus,
if a large number of interest group affiliations mirrors a more central positioning of the
respective politician, it may not induce divergence but rather align a politician with the
majority.
Apart from controlling for the heterogeneity of politicians and parties, economic and
social heterogeneity within an electoral district may play an important role. Besides elec-
toral institutions, such as district magnitude, there are other factors which may influence the
number of parties or other control variables (see, e.g., Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994).3 Es-
2Formally, we exclude parties with less than 204 decisions in parliament and thus less than two members
over the whole dataset (we analyze 102 referendums).
3For a number of different controls see, for example, Lijphart (1990), Neto and Cox (1997), Rae (1971) or
Benoit (2001).
594 Public Choice (2012) 151:585–610
pecially macroeconomic indicators such as the level of regional income as well as inequality
have been used as controls (see Vatter 2003; Neto and Cox 1997). It is reasonable to assume
that juggling heterogeneous interests could be challenging for a member of parliament if
he/she tries to vote with the majority (see, e. g., Gerber and Lewis 2004). To control for the
influence of intra-cantonal heterogeneity we use indicators of population density (Density),
income inequality (Inequality) and regional income (Income). In line with existing empir-
ical work on Switzerland, we always use a dummy for the Latin (i.e., French and Italian
speaking) cantons. This dummy picks up cultural differences between those and the Ger-
man speaking cantons.
Swiss voters have the possibility to change party list combinations at elections (panacha-
ges). Panachages refers to the possibility of voters to add candidates from other party lists to
their chosen list. In cantons where a high number of ballot papers where changed (Changed-
BallotPapers), political competition is likely to be high. Panachages may lead to more ex-
treme and dispersed positions (see, e.g., Vatter 2003), as the possibility of altering the party
list may increase the number of political positions of individual candidates. Thus, we expect
a positive coefficient.
Moreover, we control for whether a referendum took place in the same year as the par-
liamentary election (RefElection). We expect that during such years, positions of individual
politicians and the majority are less divergent.
As a final test of robustness, we analyze a number of additional variables measuring
party discipline coded as voting against the party line (AgainstPartyLine) and the number
of referendums on the same day (RefSameDay). We also introduce a continuous measure
for the political distance between the district and the voters at the district level as well as
national level by introducing the absolute difference in the “yes vote” of the district minus
the “yes vote” at the national level (YesDiff ).
Matching referendum data with individual voting records in parliament allows us to study
17674 decisions of members of parliament in all 102 referendums from 1996 to 2009. Note
that members of parliament may be absent at votes due to sickness, voyage or other duties.
All variables, their sources, and a number of descriptive statistics are given in Table 5 in
Appendix.
Data for the independent control variables were obtained and matched from the Federal
Statistical Office, the Swissvotes Database and the Swiss Parliamentary Services.4 Over the
whole dataset, individual members of parliament diverge from the preferences of Swiss as
well as district voter majority in approximately a third of the observed cases. The variable
Seats ranges from one to 34 and over the whole dataset the cantonal majority’s preferences
equalnational majority in approximately 90% of the cases.
The two dependent variables are correlated, i.e., when a member of parliament votes with
the district majority he/she is likely to vote as the Swiss majority too. Figure 1 provides two
histograms for the respective dependent variables.
A great number of individual members of parliament rarely diverge from the majority’s
preferences. However, very few politicians tend to diverge in more than 50% of the cases
from the preferences of the majority of the citizens.
4See http://www.bfs.admin.ch/ (Federal Statistical Office), http://www.swissvotes.ch/ (Swissvotes), and
http://www.parlament.ch (Swiss Parliamentary Services) for the respective databases and contact informa-
tion. Daniel Schwarz from the IPW in Berne (http://www.ipw.unibe.ch) provided part of the parliamentary
votes data which are matched with the other datasets.
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Fig. 1 Divergence between members of parliament and majority preferences
4 Empirical results
4.1 Baseline results
Table 2 presents our main empirical results for the variables measuring whether a member
of parliament diverges from the majority of the Swiss population (MP = CH) in specifica-
tions (1) to (3) and whether he/she diverges from the district’s majority (MP = District) in
specifications (4) to (6). All specifications report robust standard errors with clustering at
the cantonal (district) level. Next to each coefficient we report the change in the probabil-
ity to diverge from the respective majority. The discrete effects for the variables represent a
change from the first quartile to the third quartile for continuous variables and a change from
zero to one for dummy variables while all other variables are held fixed at their medians. As
we are also interested in the significance of the discrete effects we calculate robust standard
errors for the changes in the probability using the Delta method. The delta method is a nu-
merical method to achieve the approximate probability distribution of an estimator based on
a generalized central limit theorem. Especially for interaction effects of logistic models Ai
and Norton (2003) suggest the delta method to calculate standard errors of discrete effects
for correct estimation.
Turning to specifications (1) and (4) first, we find that members of parliament from dis-
tricts with a higher number of seats tend to diverge significantly more from the national
majority’s decisions (1) and the majority in their district (4) as suggested by the theoretical
discussion, i.e., the seats variable has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level in
both specifications. If the district’s majority votes as the majority of the population, mem-
bers of parliament are less likely to disagree with citizens as the negative and significant
coefficient of (Canton = CH) indicates. In mandatory referendums (RefMandatory) mem-
bers of parliament diverge less from citizens’ preferences in Switzerland as a whole as well
as from citizens’ preferences in their respective district. The same holds true for initiatives
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(RefInitiative) compared to the base category of facultative referendums. This could have
been expected as initiatives are often rejected by members of parliament and voters which
leads to less divergence. However, the negative effect of mandatory referendums is larger in
absolute terms than the negative effect of initiatives. Higher district voter turnout translates
into an increased likelihood of the representative deviating from the national and cantonal
majorities. Members of parliament from Latin cantons tend to vote less often with the ma-
jority for both measures but the effect is insignificant for diverging from the cantonal voter’s
position (MP = District).
As shown next to each coefficient in column (1), a discrete increase in the number of
seats from the first to the third quartile increases the probability of a representative voting
against the majority of the population (MP = CH) by 5.6 percentage points when all re-
maining variables are at their median values. A change from pure plurality with one seat
to a proportional system (median number of seats) would increase the probability of vot-
ing against citizens’ preferences by 2.9 percentage points. As expected, these effects of the
electoral system are marginally smaller when the dependent variable is voting against the
district population (MP = District). Increasing the number of seats from the first to the
third quartile raises the probability of voting against the district’s majority by 3.2 percent-
age points. Moving from pure plurality (one seat) to proportional representation (median
number of seats) would increase the probability of voting against the district’s preferences
by 1.7 percentage points. Discrete changes of Seats for both dependent variables are sig-
nificant at the 1% level. Members of parliament from multi-member districts diverge from
the position of the national and the cantonal median voter but moving from plurality to a
more proportional system has a lower influence on diverging from the electoral district (3.2
percentage points) than from the majority of the Swiss population (5.6 percentage points).
In other words, members of parliament from a large district identify less with their district
voter’s majority of their district than members of parliament from a small district (column
4), but the divergence is even stronger at the national level (column 1). This is consistent
with the view that members of parliament elected at a district level tend to favor their own
electorate. The effect of Seats in specifications (1) and (4) are in their sizes comparable to
the influence of other control variables such as initiatives, turnout and language. Only the
dummy (Canton = CH) has a significantly higher influence on the probability to diverge in
both specifications as expected.
In specifications (2) and (5) we check whether electoral pressure has an effect on di-
verging from the majority and whether the influence of Seats remains stable. We include
two additional controls, one for whether a politician was elected to parliament for the first
time, and one for whether the electoral margin by analyzing whether he or she is the last
on the party list being elected. The variable NewToParliament is negative and significant
as expected which suggests that politicians who were elected already several times tend
to be more prone to depart from the majority. The variable NarrowMargin is insignificant.
But most importantly, the inclusion of all these controls does not influence the effect of the
variable Seats which remains significant and even slightly increases in size.
In cantons with only a small number of seats in parliament the competition for these
seats will usually be among center parties as they are more likely to represent the decisive
voter. In large districts with many seats more parties enter the competition. If the number
of seats is sufficiently large, parties which focus on votes at the boundary of the political
spectrum may also win seats. In this case party affiliation of members of parliament itself
could explain the observed positive impact of seats on the probability of diverging from
the majority. The number of seats would then only have an indirect effect through a greater
number of parties on diverging from the majority of voters instead of a direct effect. In
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specifications (3) and (6) we include political party affiliations of members of parliament
as a very conservative test and lower bound for the influence of the electoral system on
diverging from the national majority (3) and the district majority (6). We present the party
dummy coefficients for parties in government but also include dummies for smaller parties.
Members of parliament from parties which are commonly denoted as left (SP) and right
(SVP) are more likely to vote against the majority’s interest then center parties (FDP is a
center party as is CVP which forms the omitted category). Nevertheless, the effect of Seats
remains positive and significant. The discrete effects indicate that moving from plurality
to more proportional representation increases the probability of a member of parliament to
diverge from the majority’s preferences in the population by 3.6 percentage points (column
3) and increases the probability to diverge from the district’s majority by 2.2 percentage
points (column 6).
Summarizing these results, we find strong support for the hypothesis that increasing the
number of representatives per district increases, ceteris paribus, an individual member of
parliament’s incentives to diverge from voters’ preferences. Moving from plurality to more
proportional representation increases divergence from the national population between 3.6
and 6.1 percentage points and it increases divergence from the district population between
2.2 and 3.8 percentage points.
4.2 Robustness
All robustness tests are reported in Table 3.
District heterogeneity may have an influence on the extent to which members of parlia-
ment diverge from citizens’ decisions as argued by Gerber and Lewis (2004). Therefore,
we include in logistic regressions (1) and (2) a number of variables measuring district het-
erogeneity. Overall, including heterogeneity does not have an influence on the size or sig-
nificance of the variable Seats. The probability of diverging from the national (1) and the
district majority (2) increases when moving from plurality to proportional representation as
the number of seats has a positive and significant influence in both specifications. In terms
of their sizes the coefficients are comparable to earlier estimates.
Members of parliament may face stronger political competition if voters often change
party list combinations in elections. Swiss voters have the possibility to change the party list
by so called “panachages”, i.e., they can put a person from a certain party on the list of an-
other. We measure possible effects of higher electoral competition through “panachages” by
including the fraction of ballot papers which were changed in national elections (Changed-
BallotPapers). Moreover, we take account of election years as an additional measure for
political competition and the number of interest group affiliations.
When turning to specifications (3) and (4), the extent of panachage (ChangedBallotPa-
pers) has the expected positive effect on divergence. The effect of (RefElection) is consis-
tently negative but does not reach statistical significance. The number of interest group affil-
iations is also negative and statistically significant. Thus, as argued before, a larger number
of interest affiliations does not necessarily induce divergence but instead aligns a politi-
cian with the majority if more interest group affiliations represent a broader positioning of
the politician. Controlling for these measures of political competition has no effects on the
sign or the significance of the Seats variable. This is shown in specifications (3) and (4)
for members of parliament diverging from the national majority and the district’s majority,
respectively. Politicians from districts with more seats in parliament vote more often against
the majority of the population and the population of their electoral district, i.e., their canton.
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The above results indicate a higher probability that politicians deviate from both national
and cantonal voter majority if turnout is high. If turnout is high under proportional represen-
tation it is likely that politicians are even more tempted to care for their specific (cantonal)
voter groups instead of voting along with the national majority in particular. To test this
differential hypothesis we interact the variables Turnout and Seats. The interaction serves
to identify if members of parliament from larger districts with more seats diverge more
from the population of voters when the referendum has a high participation rate. Applied re-
searchers often estimate interaction terms to infer how the effect of one independent variable
on the dependent variable depends on the magnitude of another independent variable. Un-
fortunately, the intuition from linear regression models does not extend to nonlinear models.
For our results we apply the reasoning of Ai and Norton (2003) that the discrete effects rep-
resent the total effect of a change in the probability, i.e., sum of base and interaction effect.5
Politicians from larger cantons are even more likely to vote against the national majority
than politicians from small cantons if turnout is high. This can be seen from column (5),
where we include (TurnoutM), the deviation from the median turnout, and the interaction
term (Seats x TurnoutM). Participation rates which are higher than the median participation
rate also raise the probability that members of parliament vote against the majority of their
district’s constituents but as expected the interaction term in (6) is less significant. When
turnout is high, the incentives of the representatives to diverge from the national majority
in order to align with the district majority are larger as members of parliament are elected
within districts.
Finally, we restrict our dataset to referendums where the parliamentary majority was less
clear, i.e., we focus on referendums where less than 65% of members of parliament agreed
to, or rejected, the proposals. The results are presented in columns (7) and (8). Again, the
effect of the electoral system is clear. Even for issues that passed parliament with a relatively
small margin, we find that as the number of seats increases, the probability to diverge from
the national majority’s preferences raises and the probability to diverge from the majority’s
preferences of the district increases too.
4.3 Bayesian model averaging results
The basic methodology to analyze different variables on decision outcome measures consists
of running cross-section regressions including the main variable of interest and a number of
other controls (see Vatter 2003; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994). The problem with this
approach is that economists who work empirically might not exactly know which indepen-
dent control variables should be included in their regressions. Clearly, the choice should be
guided by theory. It is also clear though, that variable selection can have an important effect
on the results and missing out explanatory variables might introduce considerable bias. In fi-
nal robustness tests, we deal with the problem of variable selection by performing Bayesian
Model Averaging (see Raftery 1995; Raftery et al. 1997).
The main idea behind Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) is to estimate the distribution
of unknown parameters of interest across a large number of different models (model space).
In contrast to classical estimations, model averaging copes with model uncertainty by allow-
ing all possible models to be considered a priori, which consequently reduces the bias of the
parameters of interest. The Bayesian approach is feasible and has been applied to various
problems in economics by other authors such as Fernandez et al. (2001) or Sala-i-Martin et
5We use the Delta method again to estimate the standard errors of the total effects.
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al. (2004). Hoeting et al. (1999) give various other examples and mention possible appli-
cations. BMA asks the researcher to specify possible regressors that might have an impact
on the respective measure whether a member of parliament votes with the majority of the
population or the majority of the district. The interpretation of the estimates from BMA is
straightforward as we can calculate conditional means and standard deviations which can be
interpreted similarly to standard coefficients form logistic regression models. Furthermore,
a posterior inclusion probability for any variable can be calculated which gives the probabil-
ity that any specific variable is included in a model, i.e., the posterior inclusion probability
gives an indication of the importance of the variable over the whole model space analyzed.6
Results of Bayesian Model Averaging are presented in Table 4.
We include all independent control variables from our dataset as well as a constant, but
exclude party dummies as BMA does not allow us technically to treat them as fixed effects.
The comparatively large number of controls may lead to problems of multi-collinearity, nu-
merical instability, and computational imprecision. To evaluate the upper limit of possible
numerical errors we calculate a “condition number” as proposed in numerical mathematics
(see Schwarz and Köckler 2004). The condition number is defined as the ratio of the largest
to the smallest non-zero singular value of the full design matrix including all variables.
Generally speaking, a very high condition number will lead to problems with numerical
estimations independent of the statistical software used. Computers work with a certain nu-
merical precisions. The higher the condition number, the higher the loss of a computer’s
numerical precision. The condition number for our full design matrix with all controls is ap-
proximately 1.5 × 106 indicating that the numerical problem is well-conditioned for digital
computation. Therefore, we are neither likely to have problems with precision nor with cor-
relation between explanatory variables, as the BMA algorithm itself chooses the variables
having the highest effect according to the Bayesian Information Criterion.
Columns (1) to (3) present the results of BMA for the dependent variable indicating that
a member of parliament votes against the population. We include all variables of our dataset
for the BMA procedure, i.e., voting against the party line (AgainstPartyLine), the number of
referendums at the same day (RefSameDay) and the absolute difference in the “yes vote” of
the district minus the “yes vote” at the national level (YesDiff ).
The conditional mean of the variable Seats is positive and highly significant as shown in
column (1). This indicates that the average effect of the size of a district on diverging from
the national majority’s preferences regarding all estimates over the whole model space is
positive. The other control variables have mostly the same signs concerning the conditional
mean in BMA as they have in the other estimates presented above. Concerning the additional
control variables, all three additional controls turn out to be significant when looking at the
whole model space. In column (2) we perform a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the sign of
the posterior mean conditional on inclusion. In the averaging procedure of BMA different
models are estimated. In each of these models the sign of the variable under consideration
is taken. It might be the case, for example, that the electoral system measured by seats has
a negative impact on diverging from national majority’s interests in some specific models
but a positive impact in others and on average. We test for this possibility and present the
resulting p-values in column (2), i.e., we test whether the coefficients of the diverse models
have the same sign as the reported posterior conditional mean. At the 1% level we can reject
that the variable seats enters other models of the whole model space with a negative sign. We
6Further explanations on BMA and applications can be found in the literature (Raftery et al. 1997 and the
follow up literature). We stipulate 1/2 as the prior probability of including any variable in the model.
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Table 4 Divergence between members of parliament and majority’s preferences-BMA
MP = CH MP = District
Cond. Mean
(Cond. SD)
Sign Test Inc. Proba. Cond. Mean
(Cond. SD)
Sign Test Inc. Proba.
Seats 0.013
(0.002)
0.000 99.9 0.005
(0.002)
0.006 69.4
CantonCHMatch50 −0.615
(0.062)
0.000 99.9 −0.849
(0.055)
0.000 99.9
RefObligatory −0.302
(0.052)
0.000 99.9 −0.469
(0.052)
0.000 99.9
RefInitiative −0.328
(0.037)
0.000 99.9 −0.254
(0.036)
0.000 99.9
Turnout 2.818
(0.216)
0.000 99.9 2.572
(0.205)
0.001 99.9
NewTo-Parliament −0.045
(0.034)
1.000 1.0 EXC
NarrowMargin 0.069
(0.036)
0.371 4.1 0.076
(0.036)
0.181 4.4
PopulationDensity EXC EXC
IncomeInequality −2.467
(0.487)
0.000 99.9 −1.755
(0.432)
0.003 98.5
GDPperCapita EXC EXC
ChangedBallot-Papers 0.245
(0.211)
1.000 0.8 EXC
RefElection EXC −0.069
(0.040)
0.371 2.3
Interests −0.029
(0.003)
0.000 99.9 −0.023
(0.003)
0.000 99.9
AgainstPartyLine 1.192
(0.059)
0.000 99.9 0.886
(0.058)
0.001 99.9
RefSameDay 0.020
(0.009)
0.371 9.6 EXC
TimeToRef 0.001
(0.000)
0.000 99.9 EXC
YesDiff 1.142
(0.389)
0.181 35.1 0.595
(0.370)
1.000 1.3
Latin 0.236
(0.049)
0.000 99.9 0.106
(0.043)
0.181 9.1
(Intercept) −0.800
(0.212)
0.000 99.9 −0.224
(0.206)
0.000 99.9
Notes: For the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) results, the conditional mean (Cond. Mean) and standard
deviation (Cond. SD) are conditional on inclusion of the variable in the model. BMA results were obtained
using the software of the R Project for Statistical Computing with the BMA package (see Raftery et al. 2009).
EXC indicates variables which were excluded from the evaluation by the “Leaps and Bounds algorithm”
perceding BMA (see Hoeting et al. 1999). The sign-test in columns (2) and (5) is a Wilcoxon signed-rank test
for the sign of the variable over all models. The p-value of the sign tests indicates whether the coefficient is
on the same side zero as its posterior mean conditional on inclusion. Columns (3) and (6) give the posterior
inclusion probability of all variables
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also calculate the posterior inclusion probability of all variables in column (3). The inclusion
probability of seats is at the maximum value, i.e. the variable should always be included.
Finally, columns (4) to (6) present BMA results when the dependent variable indicates
whether a member of parliament votes against the majority of voter of his/her district. The
posterior mean conditional on inclusion for seats is negative and highly significant. More-
over, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the sign of the posterior mean conditional on inclu-
sion indicates that the positive sign is not just a statistical artifact of aggregation. We can
reject the hypothesis that the conditional mean is negative at the 1% level. The posterior
inclusion probability is in the range of other important control variables.
5 Summary and conclusions
5.1 Summary
If a district is large and has many seats in national parliament, its electoral system exhibits
proportional representation. In small districts with fewer seats, elections within the district
follow a plurality rule. “Winner takes all” plurality districts with only one seat represent the
extreme case. Good systems of political representation align citizen’s preferences with legis-
lator’s behavior (see Gerber and Lewis 2004). We extend the existing literature by analyzing
whether the district magnitude induces members of parliament to diverge significantly more
often from the majority’s preferences when moving from small districts with few seats to
proportional representation in large districts.
To measure whether members of parliament deviate from the majority’s preferences, we
take advantage of unique data from a quasi-natural experiment in Switzerland: Swiss refer-
endums reflect voting behavior of citizens and thus how the majority values certain policy
proposals against the status quo. Referendum results can be matched with voting data for
members of parliament on exactly the same political issues with exactly the same wording.
In Switzerland, the electoral system changes from pure plurality to proportional represen-
tation as district size increases. Hence, the referendums institution allows us to identify
empirically whether members of parliament from large districts with proportional represen-
tation diverge significantly more from the majority’s preferences than members of parlia-
ment from districts with plurality or close to plurality rules. The more often members of
parliament vote in the same way as the majority of the electorate, the better they represent
the majority’s interests.
Our empirical results with a logistic regression model and district clustering strongly
indicate that members of parliament from small districts with fewer seats are more likely
to vote in the same way as their local constituents as well as the majority of the national
population. In other words, decisions of members of parliament and the majority diverge
more in larger districts with many seats than in small districts. We also find evidence for
a direct influence of the number of seats on the deputies’ behavior. In contrast to part of
the literature, the electoral system not only affects members of parliament via the positions
of their parities. Individual members of parliament from large districts deviate more often
from the majority’s preferences than members from small districts even if we control for
party membership and a number of other important factors.
5.2 Policy conclusions
Small district magnitude tends to better align individual deputies’ decisions with the ma-
jority’s preferences while proportional representation in large districts leads to more diver-
gence. Under plurality rule, as measured by a low number of seats per district, decisions
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of individual members of parliament correspond most closely to district voters’ preferences
as well as national voters’ preferences. Although positions of national and district major-
ity voters are highly correlated, our results indicate that members of parliament align their
decisions more to their district’s majority.
Our research highlights the importance of analyzing incentives in the electoral system
which may induce politicians to converge or diverge from the majority’s preferences. To
insure that individual politicians closely act according to the majority’s will, an electoral
reform towards smaller electoral district sizes could be envisioned. However, such reforms
would have to be followed with caution. Firstly, it might be argued that systems where
politicians closely follow the majority lead to under-representation of the minority’s inter-
ests. Secondly, our analysis focuses on individual choices by politicians and how individual
politicians represent the majority’s preferences. In parliament, more politicians from larger
districts can compensate their individual errors and divergence. Thus, a higher number of
politicians may lead to worse individual incentives but the aggregate decisions, i.e., the de-
cision of the majority of representatives, can well be closer to voter’s preferences than when
a single politician would decide (see Stadelmann et al. 2010).
These two reflections would need to be investigated more thoroughly before conclusive
policy advice may be offered. We hope that our approach stimulates further research and
brings a new perspective into discussions on institutional reforms. The approach presented
in this article moves beyond political outcomes such as the seat distribution between parties
and policy outcomes such as fiscal measures and targets directly on voter preferences in a
very broad sense.
Finally, our empirical results also highlight the importance of institutions. Politicians
substantially diverge from the majority’s preferences. Referendums help citizens to correct
parliamentary decisions which go against their interests and may serve as a control mecha-
nism for politicians.
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Appendix
Table 5 Data description & sources
Variable Description & Source 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. SD
MP = CH Indicator variable: Member of
parliament against majority of Swiss
voters. Swiss Parliamentary Services
and Final Votes Dataset
0.000 0.000 0.320 1.000 0.467
MP = District Indicator variable: Member of
parliament against majority of voters
in canton (district). Swiss
Parliamentary Services and Final
Votes Dataset
0.000 0.000 0.325 1.000 0.468
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Table 5 (Continued)
Variable Description & Source 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. SD
Seats Canton’s number of seats in the
national council. Federal Statistical
Office
7.000 12.000 15.820 27.000 10.854
Canton = CH Indicator variable: If majority of voters
in a member of parliment’s canton
votes as majority of voters in
Switzerland. Swiss Parliamentary
Services and Final Votes Dataset
1.000 1.000 0.904 1.000 0.294
RefMandatory Indicator variable: If referendum is an
obligatory referendum value is 1
(necessary for an amendment to the
constitution initiated by the
parliament). Swissvotes Database
0.000 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.383
RefInitiative Indicator variable: If referendum is an
initiative value is 1. Swissvotes
Database
0.000 0.000 0.435 1.000 0.496
Turnout Share of entitled voters in member of
parliament’s home canton casting a
vote in referendum. Swissvotes
Database
0.384 0.443 0.442 0.503 0.086
NewToParliament Indicator variable: If MP is a member
of parliament for less than a legislature
value is 1. Swiss Parliamentary
Services
0.000 0.000 0.419 1.000 0.493
NarrowMargin Indicator variable: If MP is elected
with the fewest number of votes on
his/her list or is single candidate on
list, value is 1. Federal Statistical
Office.
0.000 1.000 0.533 1.000 0.499
Density Inhabitants per km2. Federal
Statistical Office
159.4 229.3 509.4 523.6 868.0
Inequality Gini coefficient of income inequality
in 2003. Federal Statistical Office
0.357 0.386 0.389 0.409 0.041
Income GDP per Capita in 2005 Swiss Francs.
Federal Statistical Office
43950.0 48990.0 52380.0 60820.0 12520.2
ChangedBallotPapers Share of ballot papers which have been
altered (e.g. cross voting) by the voters
in the last election of the canton’s
National Councilors. Federal
Statistical Office
0.513 0.578 0.557 0.644 0.102
RefElection Indicator variable: If the referendum
took place in the same year as
elections took place value is 1.
Swissvotes Database
0.000 0.000 0.221 0.000 0.415
Interests Number of interest groups affiliations.
Swiss Parliamentary Services
3.000 6.000 8.249 11.000 7.139
AgainstPartyLine Indicator variable: If MP does not
follow party line value is 1. If MP
follows party line or free vote value is
0. Swissvotes Database
0.000 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.266
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Table 5 (Continued)
Variable Description & Source 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. SD
RefSameDay Number of referenda taking place at
the same day as the referendum under
consideration. Swissvotes Database
2.000 3.000 3.726 5.000 1.993
TimeToRef Number of days between final vote in
parliament and referendum.
Swissvotes Database
171.000 247.000 273.900 352.000 131.117
YesDiff Absolute difference in the “yes vote”
share of the district minus the “yes
vote” share at the national level.
Swissvotes Database
0.019 0.042 0.055 0.077 0.050
PartySVP Indicator variable: If member of
parliament belongs to the SVP (Swiss
People’s Party) value is 1. Swiss
Parliamentary Services
0.000 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.409
PartyFDP Indicator variable: If member of
parliament belongs to the FDP
(Liberals) value is 1. Swiss
Parliamentary Services
0.000 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.407
PartySP Indicator variable: If member of
parliament belongs to the SP
(Socialists) value is 1. Swiss
Parliamentary Services
0.000 0.000 0.261 1.000 0.439
Small parties Separate indicator variables for
smaller parties: GPS (Greens), EVP
(Evangelic People’s Party), LPS
(Liberal Party), FPS (Freedom Party).
Swiss Parliamentary Services
Latin Indicator variable: If the canton is
largely French or Italian speaking
value is 1. Federal Statistical Office
0.000 0.000 0.272 1.000 0.445
Notes: Descriptive statistics are based on 17674 decisions of members of parliament on 102 referenda from
1996 to 2008. Data sources indicated next to variable descriptions
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